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Letter from Co-Chairs of the Peterson-Pew Commission on  
Budget Reform
We are pleased to present this report on behalf of the Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform. It is the result of a 
two-year process that included our first report, Red Ink Rising.
In that report we called on policymakers to stabilize the federal debt through a six-step plan so that debt would no longer 
grow faster than the economy. We warned that if policymakers do not gain control of the soaring federal debt, the nation’s 
fiscal future is bleak. We recommended that Congress and the White House adopt a specific fiscal target of stabilizing the 
publicly held debt at 60 percent of GDP by 2018, and then continue to reduce the debt as a share of the economy over the 
longer term. 
This second report, Getting Back in the Black, builds on our earlier report by laying out a detailed set of reforms designed 
to help improve the nation’s fiscal position. We recommend a new budget regime that requires policymakers to set 
medium- and long-term debt targets, provides a process to reach them, and includes strong enforcement mechanisms 
to help keep the process on track. We also offer a series of reforms to provide better information to policymakers to aid 
them in making the difficult budget choices now required, and to provide greater transparency and accountability to the 
public for those choices. 
This report draws on our members’ decades of experience wrestling with a flawed budget process. We all firmly believe it is 
urgent to reform that process so that it supports the decisions necessary to turn red ink to black. The Commissioners have 
no illusions about the power of process to substitute for leaders with foresight and a public that demands fiscally respon-
sible action. Yet although process alone cannot fix the problem, we believe these reforms can help leaders balance commit-
ments with resources. We look forward to working with the Administration and a new Congress to achieve that goal.
On behalf of the entire Commission, we also thank the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, our staff 
and consultants, and all the individuals and organizations who advised us. 
  Bill Frenzel    Tim Penny   Charlie Stenholm
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The federal budget is deep in the red, and getting it back 
in the black will not be easy or swift. On its current course, 
the debt is likely to reach 100 percent of the nation’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) early in the next decade and 
would continue to grow faster than the economy thereaf-
ter. Excessive debt can do much harm: draining produc-
tive capital from private investment; increasing the interest 
payments in the federal budget, which in turn squeeze out 
other spending or room for tax cuts; and reducing the gov-
ernment’s flexibility to respond to future crises or oppor-
tunities. High debt levels also present a real risk of some 
type of fiscal crisis. The federal budget cannot continue on 
its current path.
The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform has 
spent almost two years looking at how to improve the 
federal government’s budget process. In our first report, 
Red Ink Rising, we called on policymakers to stabilize the 
national debt so that it would no longer grow faster than 
the economy. We recommended that the government 
immediately adopt a statutory goal of stabilizing the debt 
at 60 percent of GDP and enact a specific and credible plan 
of policy changes that would phase in beginning in 2012 
and achieve that goal by 2018. We also recommended that 
the commitment be backed by strong enforcement mecha-
nisms and that the debt be further reduced as a share of the 
economy after 2018.
This second report, Getting Back in the Black, builds on 
our earlier recommendations by laying out a detailed set 
of reforms to the budget process designed to help policy-
makers achieve that goal. The current federal budget pro-
cess contributes to the poor fiscal outcomes. The current 
process involves incremental, annual decisions that lack 
coherence and discipline, leaving the nation ill-equipped to 
deal with the current fiscal challenge. Budgets are created 
without a fiscal target to constrain the result. The process 
contributes to unsustainable policies because it does not 
require policymakers to lay out a fiscal plan with feasible 
limits or to consider the long-term implications of their 
decisions. We conclude that to improve the nation’s fiscal 
position, policymakers must overhaul the budget process 
as part of a package of fiscal reforms. 
We believe that budgeting can and should be more far-
sighted, disciplined, and transparent. Specific fiscal targets 
must be established and used to guide budget choices. 
Budgets should be multi-year plans to reach those targets. 
Stronger enforcement mechanisms are needed to keep the 
budget on track. And the longer-term tradeoffs required for 
this need to be made more transparent to policymakers and 
the public, leading to greater accountability. A better process 
will lead to better decisions and yield better results. 
The Sustainable Debt Act 
Given the need for comprehensive action to put the bud-
get on a sustainable path, the Commission’s first recom-
mendation is that Congress pass and the President sign a 
“Sustainable Debt Act.” 
This new law would establish a medium-term debt tar-• 
get along with annual fiscal targets and new enforce-
ment mechanisms. 
The medium-term fiscal target would specify when, and • 
at what level, the public debt would be stabilized as a 
percentage of the GDP. 
Annual debt targets would provide a path to the medium-• 
term debt target. 
A Credible Multi-Year Budget Plan 
The Commission provides a new framework whereby spe-
cific policies would be enacted to meet the multi-year tar-
gets established in the Sustainable Debt Act. 
The President would be required to submit a budget that • 
meets the statutory targets.
Congress would adopt a budget resolution that included • 
multi-year savings allocations and policy direction to other 
committees for spending, tax expenditures, and revenues 
to meet that year’s debt target, putting the budget on a path 
to the medium-term fiscal target.
To strengthen the House and Senate Budget Committees’ • 
role in guiding the process, their membership would 
include House and Senate leaders and the chairs and 
ranking members of both the appropriations and reve-
nue committees and other key authorizing committees.
Executive Summary
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Strong Enforcement Mechanisms 
The Act would establish procedures to enforce the 
enacted targets.
Statutory multi-year discretionary spending caps and a • 
strengthened pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) statute would pro-
vide discipline.
If enacted budget legislation does not meet the target, • 
the President could propose rescissions to help meet it.
If the target were still missed, spending reductions and • 
tax increases would be imposed through automatic trig-
ger mechanisms.
The Longer Term 
The Commission recommends that, after the medium-
term debt target is reached, the new budgeting framework 
be carried forward to continue reducing the debt each con-
secutive decade to safer levels.
A long-term goal would be established to continue • 
reducing the debt, and a new set of multi-year debt tar-
gets would be enacted.
After specific long-term policy plans are put in place, • 
programmatic caps and triggers would be established 
for the policies and programs that are then driving the 
debt—presumably health care, Social Security, and tax 
expenditures. 
Increased Transparency 
The Commission believes additional changes are needed 
to strengthen the budget process and allow policymakers 
to make responsible decisions about our nation’s priori-
ties. The Commission recommends reforms to increase 
budget transparency and accountability to the public.
The President would be required to report to Congress at • 
the end of each fiscal year on the effects of enacted bud-
get legislation and related actions on progress toward 
the medium-term debt targets and reducing the longer-
term fiscal imbalance.
Budget presentations would include a display of pro-• 
posed programmatic changes from current-year levels.
Both the President’s budget and analysis of the congres-• 
sional budget resolution by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) would include prominent displays of the 
long-term outlook, report progress toward meeting the 
statutory fiscal goals, and provide evidence on whether 
proposed budgets can be sustained indefinitely.
Accounting and presentation would be improved in the • 
budget for fiscal exposures; emergencies; retirement, 
pension, and long-term insurance programs; federal 
programs that extend financial guarantees or that hold 
risky assets; and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs) and other financial institutions that receive sub-
sidies from implied guarantees. 
The budget treatment and presentation of tax expendi-• 
tures would be changed to make them more equivalent 
to other entitlements and they would be fully incorpo-
rated in the annual budget process. 
Program evaluation and oversight would be strengthened. • 
The Commission’s members have no illusions about the 
power of process to substitute for leaders with foresight and 
a public that demands fiscally responsible action. Absent 
wide demand for fiscal responsibility, process reforms will 
not put the federal budget on a sustainable course. Although 
process alone cannot fix the problem, we believe these 
reforms will encourage more fiscally responsible policies 
and keep them on track, resulting in a sustainable balancing 
of commitments with resources. Put simply, they will help 
the United States budget get back in the black. 
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The United States is on a dangerous fiscal path, with the 
federal debt projected to climb to unsustainable levels. 
Under reasonable assumptions (see Figure 1 and Box 1), 
the publicly held federal debt is projected to reach 100 per-
cent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) by fis-
cal 2024, 200 percent by fiscal 2043, and will continue to 
grow faster than the economy thereafter.
figure 1. Publicly Held Federal Debt 
as a Percentage of GDP, 2010–2080
Source: Peterson-Pew Commission baseline.
Absent a credible plan and policy changes to alter the bud-
get’s course, the nation runs the risk that global credit mar-
kets will turn against the United States, leading to higher 
interest rates, poor economic growth, high levels of infla-
tion, or all three. The growing debt burden will also lead 
to rising government interest payments, which will either 
squeeze out other spending or require higher revenues, or 
both, and will certainly leave no room for tax cuts. And it 
will reduce the nation’s fiscal flexibility to respond to any 
future crises. In the longer term, the soaring debt will pass 
an unbearable burden to future generations, reducing their 
ability to chart their own budget course. 
The country must confront a number of difficult choices 
regarding federal spending and tax policies to change the 
situation and put the economy back on a track of sustain-
able growth. The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget 
Introduction
Reform believes a new budget framework is needed to 
help guide the process, help it stay on track, and make the 
choices and tradeoffs more transparent to both policymak-
ers and the public. 
In our first report, Red Ink Rising, the Peterson-Pew 
Commission called on policymakers to stabilize the 
national debt so that it would no longer grow faster than 
the economy, recommending a six-step plan:
 
Step 1: Commit immediately to stabilize the debt at 60 
percent of GDP.
Step 2: Develop a specific and credible debt stabilization 
package as quickly as possible.
Step 3: Begin to phase in policy changes in 2012.
Step 4: Review progress annually and implement an 
enforcement regime to stay on track.
Step 5: Stabilize the debt by 2018. 
Step 6: Continue to reduce the debt as a share of the econ-
omy over the longer term.
This second report, Getting Back in the Black, provides a 
detailed budget framework to improve the nation’s fiscal 
situation, by focusing on: 
Targets: adopting (1) a statutory medium-term debt target, 
(2) a multi-year budget plan with annual fiscal targets, and 
(3) a longer-term fiscal target;
Triggers: strengthening the budget process to include bud-
get caps, a strengthened pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) require-
ment, and automatic triggers to put and keep the budget 
on a sustainable path; and
Transparency: improving the timeliness, completeness, 
and transparency of information used in the budget pro-
cess to better hold officials accountable, and clearly show 
tradeoffs in budget decisions.
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box 1. Peterson-Pew Commission Baseline
The Peterson-Pew Commission created a realistic scenario to illustrate the path of likely policies and the magnitude 
of the challenges facing the United States. It starts with the standard Congressional Budget Office current-law 
baseline of August 2010 and then incorporates the effects of several tax and spending policies likely to be enacted. 
The table below compares the CBO baseline to the more realistic budget assumptions in the Commission’s baseline 
over the medium term. In particular, the Commission’s baseline assumes:
the renewal of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, set to expire in 2010, for families making less than $250,000 a year • 
and individuals making less than $200,000;
a freeze in the estate tax at its 2009 levels, rather than its elimination in 2010, and then a return to pre-2001 • 
levels in 2011 and thereafter;
continued annual “patches” to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), indexing it to inflation, to limit the tax’s • 
impact on middle-income earners; 
a permanent freeze on payment rates to Medicare physicians; • 
a gradual decline in spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reflecting troop levels that fall to 60,000 by • 
2015, with any additional deployments fully offset in the budget; and
a 1-year freeze on discretionary spending and then a return to growth at the rate of the overall economy—rather • 
than of inflation—thereafter.
CBO Current-Law and Peterson-Pew Commission’s Baselines, 2010-2018 
       
current-law baseline
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
percentage of gdp
Debt 62 66 68 68 67 67 68 68 68
Deficit 9.1 7.o 4.2 3.1 2.5 2.7 3.o 2.8 2.6
billions of dollars
Debt 9,030 10,010 10,790 11,420 11,950 12,540 13,210 13,890 14,550
Deficit 1,340 1,070 670 530 440 510 590 580 560
commission’s baseline
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
percentage of gdp
Debt 62 67 71 72 73 75 77 80 82
Deficit 9.1 8.o 5.8 4.9 4.4 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.4
billions of dollars
Debt 9,030 10,160 11,190 12,110 12,980 13,960 15,070 16,260 17,520
Deficit 1,340 1,220 910 820 780 900 1,030 1,100 1,160
Source: Congressional Budget Office data and Peterson-Pew Commission baseline projections.      
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A budget process can only be judged by its results. The cur-
rent process has allowed the federal government to commit 
to spending far more than the revenues it will collect. The 
budget is deep in the red, and getting it back into the black 
cannot be accomplished without major actions. Although 
the heart of the problem is the lack of political will to make 
responsible policy choices, the broken process contributes 
significantly to the nation’s dangerous fiscal situation. 
Today, budgets are created annually, without any kind of 
fiscal target guiding the process. There is no single identi-
fiable “budget,” and the President and congressional com-
mittees operate on separate tracks with no shared objec-
tive: the President makes a proposal; and the House and 
Senate Budget Committees may, or may not, develop their 
own budget resolutions, which, however, lack the force of 
law. Increasingly, there is no comprehensive action on a 
budget at all: rather, the government operates on a series 
of short-term appropriations or continuing resolutions, 
followed by huge omnibus spending bills, with occasional 
piecemeal enactment of changes in other spending or tax 
laws. In practice, the bulk of the government’s spending 
and revenue occurs on autopilot, without annual review or 
any constraint on growth. 
The current budget framework is too short-sighted and 
tends to focus primarily on the upcoming year. The result 
is that lawmakers routinely continue programs that could 
not withstand rigorous evaluation of their costs and ben-
efits. The short-term appeal of the government’s spending 
more than the people are willing to pay has contributed 
to deficit spending—even during periods of economic 
A Failed Budget Process
growth, when surpluses should be the norm. Erosion of 
the commitment to balanced budgets has produced an 
environment in which it has become acceptable to borrow 
in order to spend more. While borrowing is not always 
bad—it can be useful in a recession—sustained periods of 
borrowing damage the economy and eventually lower the 
nation’s living standards. 
Current unsustainable policies result in large part from a 
process that does not require policymakers to lay out a fis-
cal plan with feasible limits or to consider the long-term 
implications of their decisions. 
The way back to black is filled with difficult tradeoffs. The 
United States cannot rely on simply raising taxes to pay for 
all the commitments it has made, not only because the gap 
between income and spending is so big that tax increases 
that large would clearly hurt the economy, but also because 
the current tax system is inefficient and a drag on growth. 
The nation’s tax and spending policies have to change. 
Reforms to the budget process will be critical to facilitating 
those changes and may well prove to be the necessary first 
step. In order for any policy changes to be credible and 
lasting, the President and Congress will have to embark on 
a more collaborative process with shared fiscal objectives. 
Specific budgetary goals will have to be laid out—for both 
the medium and long term. Multi-year budgets will have 
to be put in place. Stronger enforcement mechanisms will 
be needed to keep the budget on track. And the long-term 
effects and tradeoffs within the budget will have to be made 
more transparent to both policymakers and the public. 
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The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform believes 
an overhaul of the budget process is in order. The framework 
we propose would not replace the procedures and institu-
tions established as part of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (see Box 2) but, rather, 
strengthen them by putting a new emphasis on the medium 
and long terms. Our goals are to make budgeting more far-
sighted and disciplined; produce fiscally sustainable results; 
and improve the transparency of basic budget information. 
Specifically, our approach would:
require statutory fiscal targets to guide budget decisions;• 
enact multi-year budget plans;• 
adopt an enforcement regime to keep policies on track • 
over both the medium and long terms;
Charting a New Path Through Targets, Triggers, and Transparency
ı Tax expenditures are provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, 
a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of liability. (Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011.)
limit the drivers of the long-term budget imbalances • 
through spending and tax expenditure ı constraints; and
increase the transparency of budget decisions and • 
accountability for their results. 
 
We acknowledge that process improvements can only go 
so far. They will not work without a serious commitment 
to restoring a sustainable balance between revenues and 
spending. Ultimately, it will be the policy choices and eco-
nomic performance that determine the fiscal health of 
the country. But improvements to the process can be the 
first step toward more meaningful reforms. They can give 
lawmakers a reasonable place to begin and a framework 
to sustain the process, and a more level playing field with 
which to assess the budget tradeoffs. 
box 2. Current Architecture: The 1974 Budget Act
For most of U.S. history, no single entity has been responsible for developing a comprehensive plan encompassing 
the government’s spending and revenues. Only in the last 100 years has the President formally transmitted a 
comprehensive budget proposal to Congress for consideration.
The 1974 Budget Act established a new set of congressional procedures, with a prescribed schedule. The act 
created the House and Senate Budget Committees, the budget resolution and budget reconciliation processes, the 
Congressional Budget Office, and most other major elements of today’s process. With its enactment, Congress 
acquired an institutional structure that could more nearly match the President’s ability to produce a coordinated and 
comprehensive annual budget. For the first time, the law required the adoption of an overall budget plan or resolution 
under which the House and Senate would make subsequent decisions subject to specified spending ceilings.
The 1974 Budget Act contains elements of a sound budget process. The procedures and calendar established in the 
act provide a solid foundation for the refinements now needed. The act’s reconciliation provisions and ceilings on 
discretionary spending have provided useful discipline, but the potential of the 1974 law to improve congressional 
budgeting remains largely unfulfilled. 
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box 3. The Sustainable Debt Act
The Commission proposes a new Sustainable Debt Act, with elements that would address both the medium and 
long terms. 
Medium Term
The President and Congress agree to a statutory medium-term debt target and corresponding annual fiscal targets. • 
The President submits and Congress adopts a multi-year budget plan designed to meet the medium-term target. • 
New enforcement measures ensure the budget targets are met.• 
If legislation fails to meet the specified targets, an automatic budget trigger is used to direct the budget back on track. • 
Long Term
Once the initial debt target is achieved, Congress and the President shift forward the medium-term frameworks • 
by adopting a new debt target, to bring the debt down further over a set period of time. 
Once a long-term policy plan is adopted, budget limits with automatic triggers are attached to the drivers of fiscal • 
imbalances: health care, Social Security, and tax expenditures.
The framework we recommend focuses on both medium- 
and long-term budget challenges. Prior to the recent eco-
nomic crisis, these challenges—driven primarily by the 
aging of the population and growing costs of health care—
were the largest threats to the budget. Now, as the debt has 
increased dramatically due to the economic downturn, the 
need to make changes more quickly (while also being cog-
nizant of the need not to choke off a budding recovery) is 
more pressing. Nevertheless, the long-term threats remain 
just as great. 
In Red Ink Rising we emphasized the importance of immedi-
ately putting in place a credible medium-term plan to bring 
the debt back down to 60 percent of GDP while gradually 
phasing in the policy changes as the economy strengthens. 
In this report we expand that framework and add details of 
how a longer-term goal to bring the debt closer to historical 
levels would be established and implemented. 
Given the need for comprehensive action to put the bud-
get on a sustainable path, the Commission urges Congress 
and the President to adopt a Sustainable Debt Act (SDA) 
and use this new framework to the extent possible to gov-
ern the development of the fiscal 2012 budget. The major 
elements of the Commission’s proposal are summarized 
in Box 3; Box 4 summarizes the experience with budget 
enforcement laws enacted since 1974. 
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box 4. Past Budget Enforcement Laws
Two major budget enforcement statutes passed since adoption of the 1974 Act were used for some time to enforce 
prior fiscal policy agreements. 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
Also known after its authors—Senators Phil Gramm (R-TX), Warren Rudman (R-NH), and Ernest Hollings (D-
SC), as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (G-R-H) Act—this law was designed to ensure action to cut the deficit to 
specific levels until the budget was balanced. If the deficit exceeded the target for any year, the law required the 
President to cut spending using a specified mechanism that covered nearly all programs to meet the target. The 
legislation also made changes to the 1974 Budget Act, including requiring the budget resolution to provide specific 
allocations to each congressional committee. It established several points of order to enforce budget limits and in-
creased the number of votes required to waive points of order in the Senate from a simple majority to three-fifths. 
The law established maximum deficit amounts for the fiscal years from 1985 to 1990. If the deficit exceeded the 
limits in those years, the President was required to issue a sequester order that cut nonexempt spending to meet 
the target. The legislation also made several additional changes to budget law, including reducing the number of 
budget resolutions from two to one annually. 
The deficit in 1986 was $221 billion; in 1989 it was $153 billion. However, there was great debate over whether 
the constraints implemented by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings were responsible for the decrease. Critics argued that 
budget gimmicks inflated the deficit decrease and made the law appear to be more effective than it was. 
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
In 1990 Congress attempted to control spending through caps on discretionary spending and by ensuring that 
revenue was not cut or mandatory spending increased without offsetting changes. The Budget Enforcement Act 
(BEA), enacted following a celebrated budget summit at Andrews Air Force Base called by President Bush and 
attended by administration officials and congressional leaders, substantially changed the mechanisms to move 
toward a balanced budget: instead of statutory budget targets, the BEA attempted to produce lower deficits and 
eventually a balanced budget by controlling spending, including new tax expenditures. 
The mechanisms for enforcement included spending caps on discretionary programs (those funded through an-
nual appropriations) and a requirement that mandatory spending increases or tax cuts be offset. This became 
known as the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule. Any violation of the PAYGO rule was supposed to lead to a sequester, 
(i.e., automatic reduction) of mandatory spending, although many programs, including Social Security, were ex-
empt from sequester. And in the absence of sufficient PAYGO offsets, a statutorily specified list of mandatory 
spending programs would face cuts. If the discretionary caps were exceeded, an across-the-board sequester of ap-
propriated funding was required to eliminate any excess. 
The caps and PAYGO requirements of the BEA of 1990 were in effect from fiscal 1991 through fiscal 1995; the 
terms were extended (with some modifications) twice: first through 1998 (in 1993) and then through fiscal 2002 
(in 1997). Many of its provisions were effectively waived after surpluses began to appear in the late 1990s. The 
law also incorporated a version of what is known as the Byrd Rule, after its author the late Senator Robert C. Byrd 
(D-WV). It required that provisions of a budget reconciliation bill be germane. i.e., have budget effects. The Con-
gressional Budget Office estimated at the time that over a 5-year period, the reconciliation process under the BEA 
would reduce the deficit by $482 billion.
Source: Information from Congressional Budget Office, 2006. 
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step 1:  
Adopt a Medium-Term Debt  
Goal and Annual Fiscal Targets 
Currently, there is no agreed-on fiscal objective for the 
nation. Accordingly, there are few constraints on the pro-
cess, and the federal government frequently spends more 
than can be financed from expected revenues. The result 
is unsustainable promises. For a new budget regime to be 
fiscally responsible, it must require that budgets are con-
sistent with reasonable statutory fiscal targets. 
The Peterson-Pew Commission previously recommended a 
medium-term target of stabilizing the publicly held debt at 
60 percent of GDP by 2018.2 Sixty percent has become a 
recognized international standard. We believe this goal is 
aggressive enough to reassure credit markets and is both 
economically and politically manageable. Although we have 
recommended the 60 percent target, the new regime pre-
sented here does not depend on that specific goal. We do 
believe, however, that it is critical that debt levels be returned 
to pre-crisis levels rather than being stabilized at the higher 
levels that have resulted from the economic downturn. 
commission recommendation: 
Include in the Sustainable Debt Act a medium-term 
fiscal target to stabilize the publicly held debt. 
The President and Congress should enact a Sustainable 
Debt Act that would include the initial (medium-term) 
debt stabilization target and require the President and 
Congress to develop and enact multi-year budget plans to 
meet it. The SDA would set a target for debt held by the 
public as a share of the economy by a specific year. While 
the Peterson-Pew Commission has recommended stabiliz-
ing the debt at 60 percent of GDP by 2018 in the past, the 
new framework would work with any fiscal target. 
commission recommendation: 
Include in the Sustainable Debt Act annual debt tar-
gets consistent with the medium-term debt target. 
Along with the initial debt target, the SDA would specify 
companion annual debt targets to set a reasonable path 
to achieve the medium-term fiscal target. The annual tar-
gets would be the starting point for identifying annual and 
multi-year budget savings required to keep on the path to 
the medium-term debt target. 
At the start of the congressional process, the House and 
Senate Budget Committees would estimate the savings rel-
ative to that year’s baseline needed to reach the annual debt 
target, and use the required savings estimates as the basis 
for allocating spending and revenues to other committees. 
The baseline would be updated each year for enacted legis-
lation and for revised economic and technical factors, and 
the required annual savings targets specified in the budget 
resolution would be adjusted to reflect the new base. 
It is very important that the annual targets be crafted to 
avoid front-loading the savings in a way that could destabi-
lize the economic recovery. At the same time, the annual 
targets also must not so back-load the savings that they lack 
credibility. Table 1 and Figure 2 illustrate annual targets 
that would meet the medium-term debt target. As shown 
in Table 1, the savings amounts needed to reach a 2018 
debt target of 60 percent are much smaller when mea-
sured against a current-law baseline that assumes, among 
other things, expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. 
It is also critical that the fiscal targets in the new SDA be 
flexible enough to accommodate changes in economic con-
ditions. For example, the requirements to meet the annual 
target could be waived when there is a marked deteriora-
tion in the economy, as signaled by two consecutive quarters 
of negative real growth or another similar measure. In the 
future, Congress and the President could also revisit and 
update the annual targets because of unanticipated changes 
in economic and other technical factors. Also, improved 
economic conditions would offer an opportunity to reduce 
debt at a much faster rate, as has occurred in much of the 
nation’s past history when economic growth accelerated.
2 The debt held by the public is the total of federal debt held by individuals, corporations, and foreign and state and local governments. It measures the direct current 
draw on private savings through federal borrowing in the credit markets. It does not include intragovernmental debt held in government trust funds.
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debt  annual target annual savings 
current-law  
baseline
peterson-pew  
commission baseline
illustrative 
targets
from  
current law
from  
peterson-pew
Fiscal 
Year
Percent 
of GDP
Trillions
Percent 
of GDP
Trillions
Percent 
of GDP
Trillions Billions Billions
2010 62 9.0 62 9.0 62 9.0
2011 66 10.0 67 10.2 67 10.2
2012 68 10.8 71 11.2 70 11.1 -300 100
2013 68 11.4 72 12.1 70 11.7 -100 200
2014 67 12.0 73 13.0 69 12.2 100 400
2015 67 12.5 75 14.0 67 12.6 200 700
2016 68 13.2 77 15.1 65 12.7 500 900
2017 68 13.9 80 16.3 63 12.8 600 1,100
2018 68 14.5 82 17.5 60 12.8 700 1,300
Source: Congressional Budget Office data and Peterson-Pew Commission baseline projections.   
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figure 2. Illustrative Path to Debt Target
table 1. Illustrative Annual Debt Target and Annual 
Budget Savings to Reach Medium-Term Debt Target
Source: Congressional Budget Office data and Peterson-Pew Commission baseline projections.
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Step 2:  
Develop a Comprehensive Multi-year  
Budget Plan to Achieve the Targets
Once the President and Congress have endorsed and codi-
fied the budget targets, the next step would be to put in 
place the specific policies to achieve them. 
commission recommendation: 
Require the President to submit and the Congress 
to enact multi-year budgets that meet prescribed 
debt targets.
The Sustainable Debt Act would set new procedural require-
ments for both the President and Congress, intended to 
promote the adoption of budgets to stabilize the public 
debt. The submitted and enacted budgets would include 
multi-year savings proposals, backed by specific policies 
and intended to meet the medium-term target. 
In the new framework, after the President and Congress 
agreed to a medium-term debt goal accompanied by statu-
tory annual debt targets, the President would be required 
to submit a budget whose policies are consistent with 
both the annual debt targets and medium-term fiscal goal. 
Although this requirement would have no specific enforce-
ment mechanism attached to it, the public’s expectations 
that the SDA would not be violated would strongly encour-
age the administration to comply. To ensure that Congress 
enacted savings sufficient to meet the targets, the SDA 
would establish enforcement measures (discussed below).
commission recommendation: 
Shift the focus of budgeting to a multi-year bud-
get framework where Congress adopts multi-year 
budgets that remain in place unless or until further 
adjustments are required to stay on the path to the 
debt targets in the Sustainable Debt Act. 
Every February the President sends a budget proposal to 
Congress that lays out the administration’s fiscal goals, 
fiscal path, and policy priorities; Congress follows its 
own procedures; and, eventually—almost always after the 
date required—a compromise set of bills for the nation’s 
spending and revenue are passed. But without an agreed-
on medium-term goal and annual debt targets, neither the 
President nor Congress has any incentive to be fiscally 
responsible. 
We recommend that, instead of the typical practice of pass-
ing a budget resolution that is focused only on the next fis-
cal year, Congress adopt a resolution for a multi-year bud-
get plan that would remain in place unless or until further 
adjustments were required to meet the debt targets in the 
Sustainable Debt Act. 
The multi-year budget would include specific policies that, 
if enacted and sustained, would meet the medium-term fis-
cal target and additional policy changes that would reduce 
long-term debt growth.
 
commission recommendation: 
Strengthen the membership of the House and 
Senate Budget Committees by including House and 
Senate leaders and the chairs and ranking members 
of both the appropriations and revenue committees 
and other major authorizing committees.
The congressional budget process would be strengthened. 
The House and Senate Budget Committees should be 
the instruments for setting major spending and revenue 
limits and meeting fiscal goals. Thus, their membership 
should include House and Senate leaders and the chairs 
and ranking members of both the appropriations and rev-
enue committees and other key authorizing committees. 
The Budget Committees’ role in shaping the budget would 
be enhanced as described below.
commission recommendation: 
Adopt a budget resolution with savings required to 
meet the annual budget target in the Sustainable 
Debt Act.
The strengthened Budget Committees would work together 
to set budget priorities and provide multi-year allocations 
to other committees for both spending and revenues—
including tax expenditures—consistent with fiscal targets. 
These decisions would be embodied in the annual budget 
resolution, instructing other committees on how to meet 
the annual and medium-term targets.
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Under the Commission’s proposal, the annual budget res-
olution and reconciliation procedures would become the 
leadership’s primary means of coordinating and control-
ling the budgetary actions of congressional committees. 
The Budget Committees would set binding allocations for 
the authorizing committees in order to prompt savings in 
mandatory spending and revenues, including tax expendi-
tures. If the Budget Committees did not give the autho-
rizing committees specific directions, the committees 
would have flexibility to adopt the policy changes needed 
to achieve their allocations. 
If a committee did not propose legislative changes suf-
ficient to meet its target, the House and Senate leaders, 
acting through the Budget Committees, would use budget 
reconciliation procedures to ensure that enacted legisla-
tion was consistent with fiscal targets. Their adjustments 
could also reflect any new information and circumstances 
that had arisen during the annual process, which might 
prompt adjustments to the allocations and the policy guid-
ance of the budget resolution. 
Box 5 summarizes how the steps in the Commission’s pro-
posed new budget process would work for fiscal 2012 and 2013. 
 
box 5. Budget Process under the Proposed Sustainable Debt Act
Winter 2011. Congress and the President enact legislation that includes medium-term and annual debt targets 
and a trigger mechanism to enforce the targets in the Sustainable Debt Act.
Spring/Summer 2011. Congress agrees on a multi-year budget resolution that includes multi-year tax and 
spending policies that comply with the new fiscal targets, PAYGO requirements on mandatory spending and 
revenues, and multi-year caps on discretionary spending. Congress approves authorizing and appropriations 
legislation to meet the targets.
Fall 2011. The Office of Management Budget (OMB) scores the policies enacted by Congress. If OMB finds that 
the policies fail to meet the fiscal 2012 target, Congress would have the opportunity to enact additional legislation 
to meet them. If Congress’ final budget policies do not meet the targets, the President could use new rescission 
authority to meet the targets. If the President did not do so or Congress rejected the President’s proposals, automatic 
triggers would be activated to adjust spending and revenues. 
Late November 2011. The President makes a formal report assessing whether enacted legislation has met all 
statutory debt targets.
January 2012. CBO releases a new baseline based on the budget adopted the prior year.
February 2012. The President submits his fiscal 2013 budget, showing a multi-year plan to meet the statutory 
debt targets. 
Spring/Summer 2012. Congress may pass an updated budget that includes multi-year policies to comply with 
the fiscal targets. If no new budget is passed, the prior year’s budget remains in effect. The process starts over. 
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step 3: 
Establish a Strong and Comprehensive  
Enforcement Process 
The Commission’s proposed new budget procedures may 
be helpful but insufficient to keep the nation’s budget on 
a prescribed path. Political leaders may find it too tempt-
ing and convenient to evade or override statutory targets 
or alter the policies they have adopted to meet them. 
Consequently, enforcement mechanisms will be useful to 
help ensure that such evasion does not occur. As with all 
budget rules, enforcement mechanisms can always be bro-
ken, but they can be another layer in the process to keep 
the budget on track. 
commission recommendation: 
Establish a medium-term trigger that would require 
automatic adjustments if budget legislation fails to 
meet the annual debt target.
 
To provide additional discipline, the Commission recom-
mends a debt-based enforcement mechanism, or “debt 
trigger.” In the early fall, OMB would score all enacted 
legislation and determine whether the policies were on 
track to meet the spending and revenue targets the Budget 
Committees had determined would be necessary to achieve 
that year’s annual debt target. 
If the policy targets were missed, Congress could pass 
additional legislation in an attempt to meet the target, 
including the President’s proposed rescissions under new 
authority (see recommendation below). OMB would again 
score all enacted legislation against the target: if the budget 
path were determined to be inconsistent with the target, 
the trigger would be activated. The Commission believes 
the debt trigger should be punitive enough to motivate 
lawmakers to avoid it, but realistic enough to be accepted 
as a last resort if the policies adopted fall short of statu-
tory targets. Our suggested trigger would apply equally to 
spending and revenues. 
Past automatic triggers have failed in part because so many 
programs were exempt from the trigger and it was so easy 
to bypass the restrictions. The Commission recommends 
that its proposed triggers apply to the broadest base pos-
sible, including all discretionary and mandatory programs 
and all taxes. For revenues, the Commission proposes a 
broad-based surtax; for spending, all programs—both 
mandatory and discretionary—would have across the 
board reductions. The debt trigger would be 50 percent tax 
increases and 50 percent spending cuts, with credit given 
for policies enacted that year on either side of the budget. A 
broad base would be more effective in keeping the plan on 
track because it would raise the political consequences for 
policymakers of failing to meet targets. It would thereby 
create incentives for Congress and the President to craft 
their own fiscal policies, rather than relying on formulaic 
reductions to meet the debt targets. 
 
To make the trigger mechanism politically sustainable, we 
suggest limiting the automatic adjustment so that in any 
one year it would not exceed an amount equal to 1 percent 
of GDP. So, for example, in a year when GDP is estimated 
at $15 trillion, automatic adjustments could not exceed $150 
billion. Experiences with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act and other formulaic triggers suggest that when auto-
matic reductions become too dramatic, targets and triggers 
may be abandoned. However, there has also been some 
successful recent experience with triggers; see Box 6.
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box 6. A History of Budget Triggers in the US
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (G-R-H) The Act set a series of fixed deficit targets. 
Included in the original legislation was a process—sequestration—to enforce the targets. Under sequestration 
procedures, spending cuts were triggered if the estimated deficit for that fiscal year would exceed the G-R-H target 
for that fiscal year. Originally, the law gave the Comptroller General the authority to trigger a sequestration, but the 
Supreme Court overturned that portion of G-R-H; as a result, that authority was provided to OMB. In the five years 
of G-R-H regime, two sequesters were required, one of which was reduced by legislation and the other overridden 
by a subsequent budget agreement.
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 The BEA replaced deficit targets with statutory limits on discretionary spending 
and a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement for mandatory spending programs and revenues. Sequestration 
procedures were again included to enforce the discretionary caps and the PAYGO requirements. The act was 
extended in 1993 and in 1997. Under the BEA, sequestration was triggered three times: twice for discretionary 
spending (one of which was overturned by law), and once for violation of the PAYGO process, which was also 
overturned by law.
Entitlement Caps During the congressional debates on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the 
House considered setting triggers that would be activated if entitlement spending exceeded the targets established 
in the budget. However, the final bill did not include the language. In response, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order No. 12857 that set targets for direct spending for fiscal 1994 through fiscal 1997. If the entitlement spending 
in any given year threatened to exceed the caps, the order required the President to include in his annual budget 
a proposal to reduce the spending or to suggest additional revenue. The Clinton Administration had the good 
fortune of avoiding difficult proposal for spending cuts or revenue increases because the affected entitlement 
program outlays came in under the estimates.
Medicare Solvency In the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act (the prescription drug bill), Congress imposed a 
Medicare solvency trigger designed to address long-term Medicare sustainability. The law required that the Medicare 
trustees issue a warning if two consecutive trustee reports project that general revenue will be needed to fund more 
than 45 percent of Medicare outlays. After the trustees issue such a warning, the law requires the President to submit 
a legislative proposal to reduce the general fund’s contribution to Medicare outlays to 45 percent or less. In 2007, 
the Social Security and Medicare Trustees, for the second year in a row, reported that general revenue would fund 
more than 45 percent of Medicare outlays. President Bush did not respond to the warning in his fiscal 2009 budget 
(February 2008) with any proposed specific Medicare policy changes. Instead, he proposed an automatic trigger 
if Congress and the President failed to agree on Medicare reforms. That trigger would have set up annual and 
increasing automatic percentage reduction to payments to Medicare providers. However, not only did Congress 
not take action on the President’s proposals, but it also eliminated the rule requiring it to consider the proposals 
to achieve Medicare solvency on an expedited basis. In its fiscal 2010 budget, the Obama Administration quietly 
disputed congressional authority to mandate a presidential submission of a legislative proposal. In a nod to the 
law’s original underlying intent, the President’s budget argued that its other proposed Medicare reforms and cost 
savers met the spirit if not the letter of the law.
(continued on following page)
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(continued from previous page)
Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 This act contained a trigger mechanism similar to the PAYGO trigger in the 1990 
BEA. However, because the applicability of the programs to which the enforcement mechanism is to apply is 
drawn to exclude all programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, income tax credits, low-rent 
public housing loans and expenses, and more than 100 other programs, the act’s effectiveness in promoting fiscal 
restraint is limited.
commission recommendation: 
Reestablish discretionary spending caps along with 
a strengthened pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement 
to enforce the multi-year budget that is adopted.
As part of the new multi-year budget, the Commission 
recommends enactment of a strongly enforced statutory 
PAYGO process and the restoration of caps on discretion-
ary spending comparable to those in the 1990 Budget 
Enforcement Act (BEA). PAYGO requires that the cost for 
any new mandatory spending programs or new tax provi-
sions be offset with reductions in other mandatory spend-
ing or increased revenue. Until now, PAYGO scorecards 
have been limited to budget effects of policy changes over 
an initial 5- or 10-year period. 
The PAYGO act signed into law by President Obama rein-
stated the original PAYGO rule from the 1990 BEA with 
a number of changes. It greatly expands the mandatory 
programs and activities that are exempt from reduction 
under any sequestration. The original list exempted fewer 
than a dozen programs or activities; the new act exempted 
more than 100 programs and activities, including such 
major programs as Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Fund. Also, the 2010 law does not require off-
sets (i.e., tax increases or spending reductions) for bills that 
increase the deficit so long as the legislation falls under 
one of four specified categories: Medicare physicians’ pay-
ments, the estate and gift tax, the alternative minimum tax, 
and certain “middle-class” tax cuts. The current form of 
PAYGO is weak because it includes so many loopholes for 
large tax and spending items, which permit trillions of dol-
lars in borrowing over the next decade. 
A new statutory PAYGO should include a sequestration 
process, which would impose automatic cuts in certain 
mandatory spending programs and automatic tax increases 
if Congress and the President did not enact proposals with 
offsets for any spending increases or revenue losses as a 
result of new legislation or major regulatory actions. 
Even PAYGO without the loopholes would not improve 
the fiscal picture unless broader budget reforms were put 
in place; it would merely help to keep the situation from 
getting worse. But once a plan to achieve a reasonable fis-
cal goal is in place, PAYGO could help keep it on track by 
ensuring that any actions that worsen the multi-year out-
look are at least offset by actions that produce savings. 
Spending caps would be set at the levels agreed to in the 
multi-year budget, consistent with the statutory targets. For 
example, the multi-year plan to reach the medium-term 
target might include a freeze on discretionary spending, 
with spending caps then set at that level. Caps should also 
be designed to limit spending on tax expenditures at the 
levels set in the budget. Allocations consistent with caps 
would be made through the budget resolution and adopted 
in reconciliation or other legislation. The caps would be 
enforced by points of order raised against actions inconsis-
tent with the resolution and when necessary by the auto-
matic trigger mechanism described above. Caps should 
also be designed to limit spending on tax expenditures at 
the levels set in the budget.
commission recommendation: 
Provide the President with increased rescission 
authority.
If the annual target were missed at that stage, the President 
could use increased rescission authority to help achieve the 
target; see Box 7. This authority would allow the President 
to specify additional spending adjustments, subject to con-
gressional acceptance, to meet or come closer to the annual 
target. Giving the President this additional tool would 
increase his accountability for helping meet the target.
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box 7. Enhanced Rescission Authority
For the nearly 200 years from 1789 to 1974, Presidents exercised the authority to permanently impound—i.e., 
not spend—funds appropriated by Congress, and during that time every President used that authority. The 1974 
Budget Act explicitly repealed that presidential authority and replaced it with presidential authority to withhold 
funding proposed for rescission for no more than 45 days while Congress considered the President’s proposals. 
Because the 1974 Budget Act did not require Congress to vote on the President’s proposed rescissions, the usual 
outcome was simply that after 45 days the rescissions were not implemented, and this provision had little effect 
on deficits. 
 As part of their deficit reduction efforts in the 1990s, Congress and the President worked together in enacting 
the Line Item Veto Act (LIVA), which provided that a President’s proposed rescission would take effect unless 
Congress voted to overturn it. Although the LIVA probably would have reduced spending, it was overturned on 
constitutional grounds by the Supreme Court shortly after it was enacted. 
In 2010 President Obama proposed a new rescission plan that may pass a constitutional test. The process would 
require Congress to take an up-or-down vote on any rescission proposals for which the President requests expedited 
action. Because the President’s proposed authority would not permit the rescinding of funding without congressional 
approval, Mr. Obama believes his plan to be constitutional. The Commission supports the President’s proposal as 
a way to assist in meeting the statutory debt targets. 
step 4: 
Enact Long-Term Reforms
Although it would be a very large step in the right direction, 
simply meeting the initial debt goal would not do enough 
to bring about a sustainable fiscal policy for the nation in 
the long term. 
commission recommendation: 
After the medium-term target is achieved, Congress 
and the President set new targets for the debt, lower-
ing it gradually relative to GDP over each successive 
decade to a safer level. 
Because large policy adjustments will be required to slow 
the projected growth of major programs, keeping the debt 
from growing in the long term will not be easy even if a 
medium-term goal is reached. Maintaining fiscal restraint 
will require the President and Congress to agree on major 
reforms to be phased in over time. It would also be help-
ful to adopt policies which would contribute to a strong 
and growing economy—such as fundamental tax reform, 
improved capital and labor market incentives, and protec-
tion of productive investment spending; see Box 8. The 
nation cannot grow its way out of the current fiscal situ-
ation, but strong growth will make tackling the problems 
much more manageable. 
Reducing the debt to meet the medium-term goal will still 
leave debt at a historically high level; see Figure 3. Shifting 
the framework forward with updated targets and trig-
gers would allow the President and Congress to routinely 
update the specifics of the framework to reflect changes 
in the fiscal environment and economy, while keeping a 
disciplining mechanism in place at all times. 
Both medium-term and longer-term targets are needed. 
The medium-term target would force early savings to 
avoid letting the debt reach unsustainable and increasingly 
dangerous levels and would show markets that the U.S. is 
capable of making tough choices. The early savings also 
would keep interest payments on the debt manageable and 
help preserve other budget priorities as longer-term sav-
ings provisions take effect. 
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Longer-term targets are equally needed to ensure that 
policymakers enact policies soon that would, over a long 
period, slow the growth of those components of the budget 
that are driving the longer-term structural budget shortfall. 
Without reforms to the drivers of the long-term mismatch 
between spending commitments and projected revenues, 
the debt would again start to rise after 2018. Moreover, 
merely sustaining the debt at the 2018 target would leave it 
dangerously high. The goal, therefore, should be to bring it 
down to a safer level by balancing revenues and spending, 
while allowing flexibility to adjust to economic cycles and 
to emergencies.
commission recommendation: 
Adopt an aspirational goal of maintaining budget 
balance over the business cycle. 
One way to gradually continue to bring the debt down is 
for the President and Congress to adopt an aspirational 
goal of aiming to balance the budget on average over an 
estimated business cycle. The President might be required 
to submit a budget annually that met this test. If the U.S. 
maintained a budget that balanced over the business cycle 
after fiscal 2018, the ratio of debt to GDP would continue 
to decline as the economy grew. For example, if budgets on 
average were close to being in balance and debt therefore 
did not increase while the economy grew, we estimate that 
the ratio would fall to about 40 percent by 2028, which is 
close to the level prior to the 2008–2010 financial crisis 
and recession. Figure 4 shows the effect of balanced bud-
gets on the debt if the economy grows as expected.
box 8. Policy Choices and Long-Term Growth
Not all policy changes are equal. Although a strong and growing economy is a clear requirement for any plan to 
produce a sustainable fiscal future, it will not be enough by itself to bring the debt to a sustainable level. Pro-growth 
policies—such as fundamental tax reform, and shifting the budget from one that is consumption-oriented to one 
that is investment-oriented, should be given special consideration when crafting a plan. 
In the absence of smart policy, the United States may never see a balanced, strong, and growing economy. Given 
that some tax increases and spending cuts can depress growth and thereby threaten the long-term sustainability of 
any fiscal plan, policymakers should try to adopt policies that are growth friendly or pair fiscal consolidation with 
structural reforms that will boost solid growth over time. 
The U.S. tax system has become not only an inefficient revenue collector, but also a major source of distorted 
incentives that lead to less productive uses of capital. Public investments in education, improved health, research, 
and infrastructure—if properly targeted—can be part of a comprehensive plan to stabilize the federal government’s 
debt and improve the nation’s long-term fiscal outlook. 
Any package should be weighted toward reforms of the most problematic areas of the budget, including low- priority 
and ineffective programs. A recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), which simulated the effects of combining fiscal restraint with such structural reforms, estimated that they 
would improve the U.S. growth rate by 0.2 percent of GDP annually after 2020, and if combined with structural 
reforms in the nation’s major trade partners, including China, raise global economic output and improve trade 
balances.* Fiscal restraint puts priority on directing resources to their most productive uses, defined not only by the 
priority of the public goals they are directed toward, but also by the whether the funding required to achieve them 
produces desired results at reasonable costs.
* OECD, 2010, p. 6.
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Percentage of GDP if Budgets Were Balanced after 2018
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Source: Office of Management and Budget and Peterson-Pew Commission target.
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commission recommendation: 
Adopt policy changes to deal with the longer-term 
drivers of the debt. 
The most important part of maintaining long-term sustain-
ability will be reforming the drivers of budgetary imbal-
ances: healthcare, Social Security, and tax expenditures. 
Without significant changes to those budget components, 
the overall imbalance between revenues and expenditures 
will grow—even if the medium-term debt stabilization tar-
get is met.
While it would be desirable to tackle these longer-term 
problems in a large multi-year budget package passed in 
the next year or two, along with the changes to meet the 
medium-term target, in all likelihood, a separate and addi-
tional package of policy changes will be needed to solve 
the nation’s longer-term fiscal problem. The sooner such 
actions are undertaken the better it will be, since policy-
makers will want to phase in new policies gradually. 
To deal with the long-term challenges, in addition to shift-
ing the medium-term framework forward by setting new 
medium-term targets after 2018 and trigger mechanisms 
appropriate for that fiscal environment, we suggest making 
changes that affect the budgets of the programs that are con-
tributing most to the long-term projected rise in the debt. 
Structural longer-term policy reforms are necessary to bring 
the debt down to more reasonable and sustainable levels 
over time. We suggest additional measures to help keep 
the critical areas of the budget from expanding beyond the 
nation’s fiscal means. Box 9 projects the long-term growth 
of spending and revenues under likely policies.
commission recommendation: 
Require automatic adjustments to the drivers of the 
debt if, after long-term policy plans are in place, 
the policies grow faster than they were projected to 
when plans were set. 
 
Once long-term policy plans are in place, budgetary triggers 
should be attached to the reformed programs to cap their 
growth at the budgeted amounts. These budget caps would 
apply to the budget components that are drivers of rising 
debt at the time—presumably including health care, Social 
Security, and tax expenditures. The associated triggers 
would not be used to force action, as they would be in the 
medium-term framework under the proposed Sustainable 
Debt Act. Instead, they would be used to enforce the policy 
decisions made by lawmakers, thereby playing the role of 
keeping those areas of the budget within their budgeted 
amounts. Policies could always be altered—though that 
should occur only in a manner consistent with the PAYGO 
statute, but the programs—either on the spending or tax 
side of the budget—would not be permitted to grow auto-
matically beyond their capped levels. 
Long-term triggers can be designed in a number of ways. 
One set of choices is how to adjust the three major drivers 
of long-term debt growth. For Social Security, for example, 
automatic adjustments might be made to both benefits and 
payroll taxes. For health spending, the new Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) could propose a package 
of adjustments that would require a congressional vote; 
prescribed automatic adjustments would go into effect 
only if the proposed package were defeated. For tax expen-
ditures, a cap might be imposed on the total revenue loss 
from all provisions and then pro rata adjustments would 
be made to the value of selected tax expenditures to stay 
within the cap. 
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box 9. Spending and Revenues, Actual and Projected, 1980–2080 
The U.S. debt is projected to explode over the long term.  In fiscal 2010 it reached 62 percent of the GDP, a new 
postwar high. Under basic assumptions about continued spending and revenues, without major reforms, the debt 
would rise to about 89 percent of GDP in 2020, more than 182 percent by 2040, and to 488 percent by 2080. No 
economy can sustain debt levels of such magnitude without crippling effects.
The growth in debt to these unprecedented levels is being driven by federal health care spending, insufficient 
revenue to pay for the projected spending, and interest payments on the accumulating debt. Despite some of the 
cost-saving measures enacted in the health reform legislation in 2010, health care spending will continue to grow 
faster than the economy, because of both general increases in health care costs and the aging of the population. 
By 2040 federal health care spending will have more than doubled—from 5 percent of GDP in 2010 to over 10 
percent, and by 2080 it is projected to reach over 16 percent. Social Security payments will also put more pressure 
on the nation’s resources, rising from under 5 percent of GDP today to about 6 percent by 2040 and staying at 
about that level until 2080. But as the graph shows, the biggest increase by far in federal spending will come from 
servicing the nation’s debt. Today, debt service costs are just over 1 percent of GDP, but by 2040 that number will 
grow to nearly 9 percent, and to an extraordinary level of almost 24 percent of GDP by 2080. 
The growing gap between spending and revenue projections will increase the yearly borrowing needs of the 
federal government, continuing to push debt to new highs. Upward growth in debt will eventually cause interest 
payments to surpass the size of all other programs in the budget, adding further pressure to run deficits and 
creating a vicious debt cycle. 
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box 10. Using Fiscal Rules Effectively: International Examples
Nations facing problems similar to those now afflicting the United States have developed budget systems that 
helped them achieve fiscal stability and long-term sustainability. The experiences of three of these countries—the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—have some common elements that are consistent with a recent statement 
by Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, who suggested that fiscal rules ought to be transparent, sufficiently 
ambitious, focused on variables that policymakers can control directly, and supported by public understanding and 
political consensus.* 
 A budget formulation system adopted in 1993 by the Dutch government that focused on expenditures and used 
cautious economic assumptions to create more fiscal stability illustrates the Bernanke principles. In coalition 
agreements between different political parties, separate caps on expenditures were established for each of the 
three sectors of the Dutch budget: “core” budget; health care; and social security and labor market. The coalition 
agreements also incorporated the multi-year expenditure projections of each ministry as the basis for subcaps 
within the core budget sector. Caps are set in real terms, which serve to prevent the coalition agreements from 
having to be reopened during a government’s term of office. Transfers are permitted between sectors and between 
subcaps established within the core budget sector, but surpluses in any one area can be used only to fund existing 
policies that are experiencing higher costs than projected. The consent of the entire cabinet is required to finance 
new proposals. If the budget situation turns out more favorably than anticipated, then some of the extra revenues 
can be used to cut taxes, depending on the size of the remaining deficit. 
Other aspects of the Dutch system are also relevant to Bernanke’s principles. Specifically, the Dutch anti-cyclical 
policy in the 1950s taught them how not to react to cyclical effects. Changes in the economy are very difficult to 
predict, and the political decision making and implementation of policy proposals are time consuming and often 
result in badly timed interventions. Instead of cyclically adjusted fiscal targets, the Dutch found that a multi-year 
fixed real expenditure framework was easier to understand and enforce: thus, they concluded that it was unnecessary 
to develop elaborate mechanisms to respond to periodic adjustments in economic forecasts. Their multi-year fixed 
real expenditure framework was much more transparent than cyclically adjusted targets, promoted stability and 
predictability in the budget process, and focused on variables that policymakers could directly control.** 
(continued on following page)
The experience of some other countries with systems of 
fiscal rules such as we recommend shows that they can 
help leaders sustain policy agreements consistent with 
long-term stability, provided they take into account the 
uncertainties inherent in constructing budgets and are 
therefore not unrealistic or too rigid; see Box 10. For exam-
ple, work by the economic and fiscal affairs department of 
the European Commission suggests that the effectiveness 
of a fiscal rule depends on its statutory basis, who is in 
charge of monitoring and enforcing adherence to the rule, 
and what mechanisms are used to enforce the rule.3
3 See European Commission, Economic and Fiscal Affairs, 2009.
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(continued from previous page)
Reflecting Bernanke’s four requirements for fiscal rules, Sweden provides an example of how expenditure rules have 
led to improved budget outcomes through a transparent process that focuses on spending ceilings. After a recession 
and a severe fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, nominal expenditure ceilings were introduced in 1997. These ceilings 
were accompanied by a top-down budget process and a surplus target for the general government sector of 2 percent 
of GDP (later changed to 1 percent) over the business cycle. In 2000, a balanced budget requirement was introduced 
for local governments. Annual nominal expenditure ceilings are set 3 years in advance as part of the budget process 
and are considered binding. The ceilings apply to central government primary expenditures, including transfers and 
grants to local governments, plus expenditures by the old-age pension system that is outside the central government 
budget. Each year, as part of a rolling budget framework, an additional ceiling is applied to expenditures 3 years 
out. The ceilings for these years could in principle be altered, but this has not happened. The ceilings are set with a 
margin over projected expenditures to allow for some policy flexibility and, more importantly, for increases in cyclical 
spending during an economic downturn. Any attempt by parliament to change a proposed budget has to be presented 
in the form of a complete package that respects the previously determined expenditure ceilings. 
The experience of Switzerland also reflects the Bernanke principles. A public consensus supported Switzerland’s 
decision to amend its constitution in 2003 by adding a “debt brake”—a budget requirement that limits annual 
federal government spending. This limit is equal to the level of projected revenues for that year, adjusted for 
economic factors by using a ratio of the level of the historical trend for real GDP to expected real GDP. If the 
estimates of trend and expected GDP are accurate, the government may run deficits in times of economic downturn 
but is forced to operate at a surplus when the economy improves. A notional account keeps track of any short-term 
cumulative gap between actual spending and the levels required by the constitutional provision; the account acts 
as a memory device and serves as the basis for compensating adjustments to spending in subsequent years, as 
needed, to meet the requirement. The same national consensus has so far sustained the Swiss fiscal rule through 
good and bad times.
*  See Bernanke (2010) and IMF (2009) for discussion of the factors leading to successful use of fiscal rules. The descriptions of the Dutch and Swedish systems 
are largely taken from Anderson and Minarik (2006).
** See Adema, 2010.
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The procedural reforms we recommend would be a major 
step toward stabilizing the debt, but they are not sufficient. 
To insure accountability by elected officials, major changes 
must be made to the way the budget is presented to the 
public. Currently, it is presented in ways that essentially do 
not hold the President and Congress accountable for long-
term imbalances and lack of sustainability. While short-
term imbalances can be expected during economic down-
turns, the President and Congress should have stronger 
incentives to adopt and maintain policies that will correct 
long-term budget imbalances. The budget documents now 
produced both in the executive and legislative branches 
obscure how much is allocated among different functions 
and programs and how changes in priorities are set over 
time through the budget. 
The recommended changes will require that budgets make 
better use of well-established budget concepts to highlight 
the long-term costs of both existing and new policies and 
promote comparisons among competing priorities. Some 
of the changes in budget practices that the Commission 
believes will provide greater public accountability, improved 
oversight, and better information for making sustainable 
budget choices include: explicit focus on the long term; 
more comprehensive and timely recognition of costs in the 
budget; and greater attention to the performance of pro-
grams and policies.
Transparency and Presentation 
Budgets should provide relevant and timely information 
to help lawmakers make better decisions and give the pub-
lic a clear picture of how the nation’s resources are being 
used. The inability of decision makers and the public to 
obtain and interpret budget information contributes to fis-
cal imbalances, wastes scarce resources, and threatens par-
ticipatory democracy. Although a complex budget reflects 
the complexity of the world, its current impenetrability is 
unnecessary given the ready availability of modern infor-
mation technologies. 
First and foremost, elected officials should be held account-
able through various budget presentations for all changes 
that are taking place under the budgets they propose, adopt, 
Accountability and Transparency Through  
Better Use of Budget Concepts
and allow to continue. These changes include those that 
they legislate, as well as those that reflect promises made 
by past Congresses but for which no funds have been allo-
cated. That is, the budget should give a clear picture of the 
overall path of growth or decline from current levels in spe-
cific program areas, whether or not they were first adopted 
by the current or by past Congresses and Presidents. For 
some purposes, it will still be useful to separate out bud-
getary consequences of new laws from the total changes 
achieved under each budget, but the public should first be 
shown—as they were for most of the nation’s history—
what is growing and what is being cut relative to current 
levels of spending and taxation. 
A central element in budgeting is the “baseline”—a pro-
jection of revenues and outlays under the assumption that 
current laws and policies are unchanged. Baselines are 
usually the starting point for developing a budget because 
they show the current and future consequences of past 
decisions. Over time, they have also become important as 
a base for estimating the budget effects of policy changes.
In the ideal, budgeting would proceed from a zero base, 
with every dollar of expenditure and tax reexamined each 
year to determine its worth relative to every other dollar 
of expenditure. In reality, however, most budgeting has 
been incremental—that is, focused on changes in spend-
ing and taxes from what they have been in the past. Before 
the advent of extraordinary growth in permanent spend-
ing through “mandatory” programs or entitlements, as 
well as tax subsidies (tax expenditures), these incremental 
changes were largely presented as changes from past lev-
els. The defense budget would increase by some amount 
and the housing budget by another and the public would 
view those changes as reflecting changes in priorities set 
by each Congress. Thus, during the first 130 years of the 
country’s existence, the previous year’s levels of revenues 
and outlays often were used as the reference baseline. 
Today, it is generally agreed that a baseline constructed 
using a strict interpretation of current law is most often 
appropriate for measuring the budget cost of changes in 
law. However, the Commission recognizes the value of 
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other projections of revenues and outlays, such as its own, 
because they offer a more realistic projection of congres-
sional actions and therefore the magnitude of the long-
term fiscal imbalance. 
As discussed below, the best starting point for developing 
next year’s budget may be neither a projection nor a base-
line, but, rather, the levels of spending and revenues in the 
current year. Use of either current law or current policy as 
the base against which to measure changes has the effect of 
walling off changes in mandatory spending and revenues 
that were allowed to take place by elected officials as if they 
had no responsibility for them. As a result, ever-growing 
shares of the budget appear to be on autopilot, off limits to 
the interventions of policymakers. 
commission recommendation: 
Begin budget presentations with a display of pro-
posed changes from current year levels, accom-
panied by an explanation of the causes of those 
changes.
Among the many consequences of the current way of 
reporting “change” or “incremental” budgeting only from 
a baseline of current law is that the public is given confus-
ing reports on what are “cuts” and what are “increases.” 
For instance, the child credit is not indexed for inflation, so 
spending on it is scheduled to decline over time. However, 
if Congress offset only part of this decline, it would be 
reported by budget offices, as well in most press accounts, 
as an increase. Alternatively, if Congress cut the estimated 
growth rate of Medicare from 6 percent to 5 percent in a 
world of 2 percent inflation, that spending would still grow 
in real terms by 3 percent, but the budget offices would 
report the change as a “cut.” Thus, budget documents—
and, following from them, news reports—often end up 
reporting cuts (in real spending) as increases (from cur-
rent law) and increases (in real spending) as cuts (from 
current law). 
The Commission recommends the use of current levels to 
highlight the rate at which components of the budget are 
expected to change from year to year under current law 
and proposed changes in law. The Commission does not 
propose abandoning calculations of current law changes 
for certain legislative purposes. But these changes should 
be reported as a subset of the total change in spending 
or taxation in each program area. In this way, the budget 
would give renewed emphasis to the total changes in the 
budget, not only those that result from legislation enacted 
in a given year. 
Put another way, budget documents must begin to report 
in a way that holds elected officials accountable for changes 
that take place as a function of all laws, not just those that 
are newly enacted. If policymakers chose to permit spend-
ing or revenues to continue to change as mandated by exist-
ing laws, documents that show those changes from current 
levels would enable the public to hold them accountable 
for those choices.
Table 2 illustrates how current levels can be used to high-
light the sources of change in outlays from the preceding 
year. Under the Commission’s proposal, this type of table 
would be expanded to show changes over 5- and 10-year peri-
ods, as well, under a President’s budget proposals and as a 
result of congressional actions or inactions during the year. 
 
commission recommendation: 
Require the President to report to Congress at the 
end of each fiscal year the effects of enacted budget 
legislation and related actions on progress toward 
the medium-term debt targets and reducing the 
longer-term fiscal imbalance.
Presidents are far more likely to take responsibility for the 
long-term condition of the government if the public holds 
them accountable. One way to create a closer association 
between the President and the fiscal future is to require 
Presidents to address this topic in a highly visible forum. 
Such a presentation would make it more difficult for a 
President to shift responsibility for a sustainable budget 
to future Presidents. An annual statement to a joint ses-
sion of Congress at the conclusion of a budget year, for 
example, would focus public attention on the performance 
of the President and Congress in reaching their agreed-on 
and set fiscal goals and targets. It could also be a public 
starting point for developing the next fiscal year’s budget. 
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2009 2010 (estimated) Change: 2009–2010
o
u
tl
ay
s
discretionary
Defense 782 855 73
Nondefense 437 553 116
Subtotal 1,219 1,408 189
mandatory
Social Security 678 715 37
Medicare 425 451 26
Medicaid 251 275 24
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) 151 -73 -224
Health reform 6 6
Other mandatory 607 749 142
Subtotal 2,112 2,123 11
Net interest 187 188 1
total outlays 3,518 3,721 203
total receipts 2,105 2,165 60
Deficit -1,413 -1,556 -143
Debt held by the public 7,545 9,298 1,753
Addendum: Total tax expenditures* 1,152 1,198 73
* Tax expenditures are revenue losses that otherwise would have been collected through corporate and individual income taxes. Tax expenditure totals do not adjust 
for interactive effects between and among provisions.
Source: Unpublished analysis by Eugene Steuerle and Stephanie Rennane, The Urban Institute, 2010. Based on The Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011, 
Office of Management and Budget; and data from the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center.
table 2. Example of Change in Outlays from Current Levels ($ billions)
Long Term Budgeting and Accountability
Red Ink Rising, the Commission’s first report, addressed 
the central failing of current budget practice: neglect of the 
long-term limit on government resources. As a result, the 
President’s budget and the congressional budget resolu-
tion largely ignore the long-term outlook. 
Both the President and Congress should highlight the 
long-term outlook through improved reporting in budget 
documents and additional reports to the public on formal 
exposures and threats to the budget. Such regular public 
reporting on the sustainability of the budget and its long-
term direction would increase elected officials’ account-
ability for addressing the task of a sustainable budget. 
commission recommendation: 
Include in both the President’s budget and the 
Congressional Budget Office’s analyses of the bud-
get prominent displays of the long-term projections, 
progress toward meeting the statutory fiscal goals, 
and evidence on whether proposed budgets can be 
sustained indefinitely.
To provide greater accountability and to develop wider 
public understanding of the long-term fiscal outlook, the 
budget should highlight the expected fiscal implications 
of current policies, including the accrued cost of commit-
ments and exposures that will, under current law, add to 
future deficits and debt. Right now such analyses are pro-
duced regularly by OMB and CBO, but receive little atten-
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tion. CBO’s analysis is not integrated with its scoring of the 
budget resolution and budget-related legislation.
In 2010, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board 
(FASAB) began phasing in a new financial reporting stan-
dard to enhance the transparency of the government’s 
financial imbalance over the long term.  The new required 
statement of fiscal sustainability, according to FASAB, 
will help the public “understand better the extent to which 
future budgetary resources will likely be sufficient to sus-
tain public services and to meet obligations as they come 
due.”  Similar data, usually referred to as measures of the 
fiscal gap, should be prominently displayed and interpreted 
in the federal budget.
commission recommendation: 
Require that the Office of Management and Budget 
prepare and publish an analysis of fiscal exposures 
in each year’s budget. 
The public debt does not measure the gap between likely 
future commitments under current law and the revenues 
projected to finance them. That long-term gap, and its year-
to-year change, can be estimated from information in the 
annual financial statements of the U.S. government and 
other public sources, but it needs to receive greater promi-
nence in the budget. 
A short “Citizen’s Guide to the Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal 
Future,” written in plain English, should be submitted 
with each budget. The report would provide information 
on each major program or functional grouping of pro-
grams, including a present-value estimate of the cost of 
each long-term exposure, and explain changes from the 
previous year. It also would describe how the President’s 
proposals relate to the long-term fiscal health of the nation, 
how the long-term outlook has changed, and the sources of 
change—legislative, technical, economic—from the previ-
ous year’s outlook. 
Improving Cost 
Measurement and Recognition
Current practice has moved away from the sound budget 
concepts of up-front recognition of costs and comprehen-
sive measurement of resource use. Instead, current prac-
tice encourages deferring recognition of costs until after 
they have been incurred and measures some important 
costs too narrowly or not at all. Thus, budgets systemati-
cally understate current resource use and overstate uncom-
mitted future resources. Four key budget components that 
are now not appropriately recognized or measured are the 
costs of emergencies; retirement, pension, and long-term 
insurance programs; programs that provide financial guar-
antees and loans or that hold risky assets; and subsidies to 
government-sponsored enterprises. 
commission recommendation: 
Change the process of budgeting for emergen-
cies, annually outlaying to an emergency reserve 
amounts sufficient to pay the expected average 
annual cost of emergencies, with strict rules govern-
ing the use of the emergency reserve. 
Current budget practices recognize the costs of natural 
disasters and economic and defense emergencies only 
when adverse events occur. The usual justification for this 
delayed recognition of the cost of current policy is that no 
one knows when such events will happen or how severe 
they will be. The claim is obviously true, but it does not 
address the public harm that results from the current prac-
tice. First, there is no uncertainty about whether such events 
will occur. They will, of course, and preparations for them 
in order to mitigate losses can only be taken prior to their 
occurrence. Pretending year after year to be surprised by 
“unexpected” adversity is an exercise in self-delusion that 
increases costs. Second, ignoring large uncertain future 
reductions in income causes both lawmakers and the pub-
lic to over-consume and under save during good times.4 
As a result, the forced reduction in consumption after an 
“emergency” is greater than it would be if the government’s 
financial plan took such occurrences into account.
commission recommendation: 
Account on an accrual basis for retirement, pension, 
and long-term insurance programs so that collec-
tions of contributions and fees and expected outlays 
are recognized in the budget when the government 
commits to making deferred and contingent payments. 
4 For a discussion, see Phaup and Kirschner, 2010.
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5 For discussion, see Lucas and Phaup, 2010, 2008; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2010b.
Recognizing the costs of pensions, other post-employment 
benefits, insurance, and similar guarantees in the budget 
when they accrue would more closely match the budget’s 
recognition of costs with the point of budgetary control. It 
would thereby increase opportunities to control those costs 
before they have to be paid. It would also avoid treating 
employee contributions, insurance premiums, and other 
committed fees as general fund resources that are available 
for spending on other purposes. 
Shifting from cash to accrual recording of retirement 
benefits and insurance would not increase total costs. It 
would simply move the recognition of future cash outflows 
forward in time. That is, with accrual accounting, outlays 
are recognized when obligations are incurred rather than 
when they are paid. 
The federal budget has used an accrual basis of accounting 
for direct loans and loan guarantees since fiscal 1992. The 
budget currently accounts for about $1 trillion of direct fed-
eral loans and $2 trillion in loan guarantees on an accrual 
basis. Interest on the entire public debt is also accrued in 
the budget as earned, rather than when paid. Technical 
challenges in estimating accruing costs are similar to those 
faced when estimating costs for credit programs. The 
Commission recommends this approach only for federal 
retirement benefits and long-term insurance. We explicitly 
exclude social insurance programs from this proposal, in 
part because not all of their commitments are legal obliga-
tions under current law and court interpretations. Other 
reasons include technical issues in estimating their size 
and the difficulty of treating promises of future benefits 
as a liability when reserves have not been set aside to meet 
that liability. 
commission recommendation: 
Use fair-value accounting in the budget when 
estimating the costs and obligations of federal pro-
grams that extend financial guarantees and loans or 
that hold risky assets. 
Two decades of experience with accrual treatment of fed-
eral credit has demonstrated that current valuation rules 
understate the subsidies that government provides through 
direct and guaranteed loans and other activities that shift 
risk to taxpayers.5 To correct this understatement, the bud-
get should use fair-market values in calculating costs for 
financial guarantees, insurance, direct loans, loan guaran-
tees, and programs that invest in risky financial assets. Fair-
value accounting would make clear that the federal govern-
ment cannot invest in risky assets more cheaply nor earn a 
higher rate of return than do private firms or individuals. 
Ultimately, taxpayers bear all the costs of investing, and 
this fact should be explicitly reflected in the budget.
Accounting for financial guarantees, insurance, direct 
loans, and loan guarantees on an accrual basis is the first 
step in measuring the cost of these activities in a timely 
manner. But the cost measure must also include risk. 
Without that component, the budget understates the cost 
of these programs. 
commission recommendation: 
For government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and 
other financial institutions that receive subsidies 
from implied guarantees, explicitly show in the bud-
get the cost of those guarantees.
The budget does not recognize the cost of government guar-
antees that fall short of explicit full faith and credit backing 
by the federal government. That exclusion includes artfully 
implied guarantees that have been extended to enterprises 
that are privately owned but have implicit government 
guarantees, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). 
Current GSEs include the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
Farmer Mac. The costs of subsidizing the borrowing of 
GSEs are not currently included in budget totals. Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are painful reminders of the conse-
quences of this omission. No costs were recognized for the 
government’s backing prior to their collapse and govern-
ment takeover in September 2008. The budget also fails to 
account for the support likely to be provided to the largest 
financial institutions that are regarded as “too big to [be 
permitted to] fail.” 
These exclusions from budget coverage understate the gov-
ernment’s commitment of scarce resources and encourage 
policymakers to use those “free” instruments of policy. 
However, when a crisis occurs, the implied guarantees 
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become explicit costs that the government has little choice 
but to pay.
One consequence of treating implied guarantees as though 
they were explicit is that it would probably end the use of 
implied guarantees as an instrument of policy, because 
explicit guarantees would cost no more than less valuable 
implied ones. This shift to explicit guarantees would be 
consistent with greater transparency and accountability in 
the use of federal resources. 
It should be noted that if the recommended changes in the 
way costs are estimated and incorporated in the budget had 
been made previously, the current-law baseline would now 
show larger deficits. That information would represent a 
more comprehensive and timely measure of the federal 
deficit under current law. 
A New Focus on Tax Expenditures
The largest single omission of fiscal resources from the 
budget is the exclusion of tax expenditures, or spending 
through the tax code. Tax expenditures include exclusions, 
deductions, credits, and deferrals that reduce taxes owed for 
some but not all taxpayers in the same economic circum-
stances. Tax expenditures have grown in recent years to rival 
discretionary spending in magnitude: they now total about 
$1 trillion a year. The Commission recognizes that there are 
legitimate technical arguments about how to measure tax 
expenditures, including whether to start from a consump-
tion or income tax base, and acknowledges the inexactness 
of their cost estimates. Nevertheless, we believe these can 
be dealt with in a way that does not pose a serious barrier 
to including them in the budget displays and considering 
them as part of expenditures in the budget process.
commission recommendation: 
Change the budgetary treatment and presentation 
of tax expenditures to make them equivalent to 
other entitlements and to facilitate tradeoffs be-
tween the delivery of benefits through the tax code 
and spending.  
More specifically, the Commission recommends 
that the President and Congress:  
Display tax expenditures and spending programs •	
together in the budget so that resources allocated 
to one purpose by alternative means can be com-
pared with total amounts allocated to other uses. 
Include tax expenditures in the budget resolution •	
allocations and in reconciliation instructions to 
committees of jurisdiction. 
Require the executive branch and CBO to provide •	
information and analysis on the use, incidence, 
and efficiency of every major tax expenditure 
(preference) in comparison with alternative policy 
instruments.
 
The salient aspect of tax expenditures for budget reform 
is that they are currently almost invisible in the budget, 
although, through them, the government delivers virtually 
identical benefits as by writing checks. Tradeoffs between 
spending programs and tax expenditures are rare, in part 
because taxes and spending are for the most part under the 
jurisdiction of separate congressional committees. Despite 
their spending equivalence, tax expenditures appear to 
have no budget cost because they are included in the bud-
get only as unidentified uncollected revenues. Because of 
their near invisibility, they are subject to even less com-
petition from other uses of resources than is mandatory 
spending. Furthermore, once enacted, the benefits they 
convey can grow year after year with little if any oversight 
or evaluation.
Tax expenditures are reported by both the Joint Committee 
on Taxation in a special study each year and by the U.S. 
Treasury as a special appendix to the President’s annual 
budget proposals. However, their visibility, use, and effec-
tiveness would be improved by showing the estimated rev-
enue loss, both by provision and by policy objective, along-
side similar cash grant and credit assistance programs 
and by assessing their contributions to those objectives. 
To ensure that they are fully recognized in making budget 
choices, tax expenditures would be included in the alloca-
tions of the House and Senate Budget Committees to other 
committees through the budget resolution and in recon-
ciliation instructions to meet fiscal targets.
Table 3 illustrates how tax expenditures might be reported 
alongside their equivalent cash outlays by functional cat-
egories. Displaying tax expenditures more prominently 
and alongside equivalent expenditures would give policy-
makers and the public a more complete statement of bud-
get support for each policy objective. It would also show 
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table 3. Fiscal 2010 Outlays and Tax Expenditures by Function ($ billions)
Function Outlays Tax Expenditures* Total
National defense 719 13 732
International affairs 51 46 97
General science, space, and technology 33 9 42
Energy 19 13 32
Natural resources and environment 47 2 49
Agriculture 27 1 28
Commerce and housing -25 362 337
Transportation 106 4 110
Community and regional development 28 3 31
Education, training, employment, and social services 143 189 332
Health 372 185 557
Medicare 457 n/a 457
Income security 686 199 885
Social Security 721 32 753
Veterans benefits and services 125 5 130
Administration of justice 55 n/a 55
General government 29 n/a 29
Net interest 188 n/a 188
Undistributed offsetting receipts -61 n/a -61
Interest n/a 1 1
General-purpose fiscal assistance n/a 53 53
Aid to state and local governments n/a 81 81
Total 3,721 1,198 4,919
Addendum: Total discretionary outlays for 2010 are estimated by OMB to be $1.4 trillion. 
* Tax expenditures are revenue losses that otherwise would have been collected through corporate and individual income taxes. Tax expenditure totals do not adjust for 
interactive effects between and among provisions. 
SOURCE: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables and Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal year 2011.
the magnitude of budget resources that derive from both 
direct spending and tax expenditures. In formal budget 
documents, this type of table would be expanded to show 
5- and 10-year projections. 
Performance and Oversight
In recent years the federal government has expanded 
efforts to measure and report on its own performance. The 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) 
required agencies to prepare plans and reports on perfor-
mance of all major programs. The Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) required agencies to assess their major 
programs using common criteria. The Obama administra-
tion has continued to emphasize program evaluation and 
performance reviews. These reforms have institutionalized 
a focus on performance in executive budget formulation. 
They have also yielded an outpouring of information on the 
results of government programs. But, to date, Congress has 
made little use of this information. With the growing vol-
ume of potentially useful performance information, the task 
now is to organize this information in an accessible form so 
that it might be used in policy and budget decisions.
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commission recommendation: 
Use budget missions or objectives as the core orga-
nizing device for the President’s budget. 
Budgets are not currently organized in a way that helps pol-
icymakers and the public relate costs to results. Spending 
for a single purpose can be scattered across many programs 
and spending and taxing categories involving a multitude 
of agencies and congressional committees. In addition, 
support for many purposes can be found in tax provisions 
that function like spending programs. As a consequence, 
no policymaker or constituent has reasonable access to a 
comprehensive measure of budget resources organized by 
policy objectives. For example, nearly one-half of FY 2009 
budget authority for homeland security was provided to 
agencies outside the Department of Homeland Security. 
The budget contains the kernel of an organizing structure 
that could guide a more comprehensive, goal-oriented 
resource allocation and assessment process. Congress uses 
budget functions to set its budget priorities and as the basis 
for budget resolution allocations to authorizing and appro-
priations committees. Functional classifications give some 
idea of how resources are allocated to major government 
missions and cut across both agency and congressional 
committee jurisdictions. However, budget functions and 
subfunctions are very rough proxies for broad missions of 
the government. A reorganization of the budget accounts 
by mission or objective, accompanied by analyses of how to 
improve the achievement of each mission, would focus con-
gressional attention and accountability more on the results 
achieved with federal dollars and less on the inputs used. 
commission recommendation: 
Charge the Government Accountability Office with 
reviewing and assessing the effectiveness of selected 
groups of programs and policy instruments against 
their policy goals and reporting regularly to the 
budget committees on opportunities to reallocate 
resources to more efficient and higher-return uses.
The Budget Committees would select several major mis-
sions to review each year. In concert with other commit-
tees, they would undertake a rigorous reexamination of 
those policy areas through hearings and other studies. 
To support this process, the Budget Committees would 
request that the Government Accountability Office review 
and assess the effectiveness of selected groups of programs 
and policy instruments against their contribution to major 
federal policy goals. 
These reviews can be expected to produce legislation to 
shift resources to more effective uses. In each subsequent 
year, the Budget Committees would work with the other 
committees to develop a performance-based reconciliation 
bill drawing on the results of oversight and review of the 
budget functions selected that year.
commission recommendation: 
Devise a system of national indicators to be used 
in conjunction with the President’s budget to place 
budget decisions in a broad performance context.
The federal budget needs to place federal budgetary deci-
sions in the context of state and community initiatives—
including private initiatives—that contribute to broader pol-
icy outcomes. One way this can be done is by encouraging 
the development and use of a series of national indicators. 
A set of key indicators—including measures of national 
and personal security, health, environmental quality, eco-
nomic opportunity, community development, governance, 
and national economic growth—would allow policymakers 
and the public to judge the state of the nation and its direc-
tion. Other nations have already developed and are using 
these metrics as indicators of government performance 
and guides to policy change. The National Academy of 
Sciences and others have begun work on such a system for 
the United States.
Once a set of indicators has been developed, the next step 
is to consider how to tie budget deliberations to such broad 
measures by establishing the specific contributions that 
government programs and finances make to broad national 
indicators. Although complex, such linkages are essential if 
the budget is to be used strategically as the nation’s primary 
method of steering the nation toward major national goals.6 
6  For a discussion, see, especially, Walker, 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003.
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The reforms recommended in this report constitute a 
new framework for policymaking, designed to support 
informed decisions that will put the federal budget back on 
track. These reforms are based on a return to the traditional 
American fiscal view that borrowing should be limited and 
that budgets should be balanced, except in wartime and 
major recessions. 
The Commission has concluded that a stable and widely 
supported set of fiscal rules, targets, and new procedures 
are needed to stabilize—and, over time, lower—a danger-
ously high national debt burden. Changes in the ways in 
which budget concepts are applied and information is 
organized could help policymakers adhere to those rules, 
targets, and new procedures after they are established. 
We have left many related issues unaddressed. For exam-
ple, the federal government must take special account of the 
contribution of state and local governments to the nation’s 
well being. Our federal system of government has histori-
cally assigned primary responsibility for such domestic 
policy areas as health, welfare, police, and infrastructure to 
the nonfederal levels of government. Recent decades, how-
ever, have seen growth of the federal role in influencing 
domestic policy outputs at the state and local level through 
the carrot of grants and the stick of mandates. Accordingly, 
the spending and revenues of different levels of govern-
ment have become increasingly intertwined. Moreover, 
the federal government increasingly depends on state 
and local governments to implement nearly every major 
domestic policy initiative taken at the national level since 
the New Deal. For example, state and local governments 
will be responsible for the health care of more Americans 
than the federal Medicare program as a result of the expan-
sions of Medicaid and new health insurance exchanges to 
be established under the 2010 health reform legislation. 
Conclusion
It may be tempting for lawmakers to shift costs to state and 
local governments in the face of a national fiscal retrench-
ment, but such a step would exact a steep price for the U.S. 
system of shared governance. It would risk eroding the state 
and local fiscal capacity and adaptability that are strengths 
of a healthy national system. The best prospect for resolv-
ing national fiscal imbalance is coordinated action across 
the levels of government in the federal system. Because 
most public problems spill over their nominal boundaries, 
the most effective way to address them is through shared 
governance and financing.
Although the focus of this report is on the budget process, 
the Commission recognizes that much of the unfinished 
work involves broader political reform. Declining public 
support for governing institutions—including the execu-
tive branch and Congress—reflects broad disillusionment 
with the nation’s ability to grapple with its largest needs, 
including fiscal instability. The Commission is not recom-
mending any broader institutional reforms, but some—
the structure of congressional committees and redistrict-
ing are two obvious ones—are needed to help the political 
system function in a manner that produces more fiscally 
sustainable outcomes. It is also necessary to restore the 
public’s confidence in their political governance systems; 
until more people are convinced that their political lead-
ers can set aside perceived short-term partisan advantage 
to address the long-term national interest, they will not be 
convinced to set aside their own near-term interests to sup-
port policy changes to stabilize the debt. When a major-
ity of Americans are convinced that political leaders will 
deliver on their promises, the budget reforms we recom-
mend can be effective.
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As both an outreach and research tool, The Committee for a 
Responsible Federal Budget created the “Stabilize the Debt!” 
online simulator (http://budgetreform.org/stabilizethedebt/). 
The simulator presents users with 88 different spending and 
appendix
Results of the CRFB “Stabilize the Debt!” Simulator
Measure Cumulative Savings  through 2018 ($ Billions)
Percent of Users 
Supporting
Eliminate Certain Outdated Programs -40 89.5
Cut All Earmarks and Devote Half of Savings to Deficit Reduction -80 88.5
Reform International Tax System -120 77.9
Enact Medical Malpractice Reform -50 77.5
Reduce Farm Subsidies -80 77.4
Raise Normal Retirement Age to 68 -110 77.3
Include all New State and Local Workers In Social Security -80 76.3
Reduce Tax Gap -20 74.3
Grow Discretionary Spending with Inflation 0 72.3
Decrease Troop Levels, Reverse Grow the Army Initiative -90 72.2
Reduce Ship Building -50 71.6
Weapons System Cuts -30 70.6
Use Alternative Measure of Inflation for COLA -100 67.9
Cut Federal Workforce 5% -130 67.8
Increase Medicare Retirement Age to 67 -80 66.9
Impose Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee -80 66.7
Limit Deductions for High-Earners -250 64.9
Cancel TARP, Rescind Unused ARRA Funds** -350 64.6
Cut Foreign Aid in Half -110 62.4
Reduce Iraq/Afghanistan Troops to 30k -740 62.0
Freeze Average Unemployment Benefits at 2009 Levels -50 60.1
Increase Gas Tax $.10/Gallon -80 59.8
Surtax on Income above $1 million -190 58.7
Convert Mortgage Interest Deduction to a 20% Credit -190 58.2
Allow All Tax Cuts, Except for AMT** Patch to Expire 480 58.0
Reduce Food Stamps to 2008 Level -100 56.7
Eliminate Subsidies for Biofuels -110 56.0
Sell Government Assets -70 55.8
Enact Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade -330 55.7
Increase Years Used to Calculate Benefits for Social Security -40 54.6
* The partisan breakdown of those who voluntarily reported their results: 18.8% Republican; 33.6% Democrat; 47.5% Independent, or did not report a party affiliation.  This 
information was self-reported, and could contain duplicate users.
** TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program); ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009); AMT (Alternative Minimum Tax); more recent estimates of savings 
from TARP and ARRA are much lower. 
revenue options by which they could reduce the United States’ 
debt.  In the table below we have compiled the results from 
the roughly 5,700 people who voluntarily submitted their 
results, as of September 7, 2010*
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